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A. Minnesota Courts Define "Resident of a Residence Premises"
On July 20, 1999, the Minnesota Court of Appeals defined the
term "resident of a residence premises" as used in a renter's
insurance policy's bodily injury exclusion.' In Illinois Farmers
Insurance Co. v. Neumann, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
concluded that a "resident of a residence" is a broader term than
"resident of a household., 2 Specifically, the court held that the
term "resident of a residence" recognizes the fact that it is common
3
for unrelated people to live together in a rental unit.
Furthermore, the court found that a person who does not fit the
definition of a "resident of a household" might fit the broader
definition of a "resident of a residence.,
4
In Illinois Farmers, Katina Neumann rented one-half of a duplex
in St. Paul, Minnesota. 5 Neumann sublet one of her rooms to
Barbara Brenny, and Neumann and Brenny shared the expenses of
rent and utilities equally.6 In September 1995, Neumann's dog bit
Brenny causing injures to Brenny that required medical attention
Brenny also lost wages." Brenny then sued Neumann for
compensatory damages, and Neumann submitted a claim for
coverage under her renter's insurance policy.9 Illinois Farmers
Insurance Co., the insurance company that wrote Neumann's
policy, sought a declaratory judgment determining that Neumann's
policy did not provide coverage for the September 1995, dog-bite
1. See Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Neumann, 596 N.W.2d 685, 688 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1999). Prior to this decision, the Minnesota Courts had not considered
whether the term "resident of a residence premises" is a broader term than
"resident of a household." See id. at 687.
2. See id. at 687.
3. See id.
4. See id.
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incident.'0 Brenny intervened in the declaratory judgment action."
Brenny argued that to determine the meaning of "resident of a
residence" in the context of a renter's insurance policy, the court
should be guided by the factors used to define "resident of a
household" within the context of homeowner's and automobileS• 12
insurance policies. The district court rejected Brenny's argument
and held that Neumann's insurance policy's bodily-injury exclusion
was not ambiguous. 13 The district court also found that "Brenny
paid rent, shared utility expenses, slept, kept her clothes, and
received mail" at the duplex she sublet from Neumann.
14
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court
noting that the two terms, "resident of a residence" and "resident
of a household," serve different functions. 5 The term "resident of
a residence" is used to determine who is excluded from bodily
injury coverage, and the term "resident of a household" is used to
16determine who is included in general coverage. The court
ultimately held that "Brenny was a resident of Neumann's
residence premises within the meaning of the bodily injury
exclusion in Neumann's renters insurance policy." 7
The Minnesota Court of Appeals adopted two main factors
that the district courts should use to determine whether a person is
a resident of the premises."' The court examined: (1) whether
there was any evidence of Brenny's intent to live at the residence
and (2) whether there was any evidence of Brenny's physical
presence at the residence.'9 The court observed that Brenny paid
10. See id. Neumann's renter's insurance policy contained a bodily injury
exclusion that applied to any "resident of the residence." See id. Thus, if Brenny
met the definition of a "resident of a residence," she would not be covered under
the policy, and Illinois Farmers could deny Neumann's claim.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 687.
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. See id. The court noted that the term "resident of a household" refers to
familial relationships and the focus of the inquiry is on living arrangements. See id.
(citing Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Viktora, 318 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Minn. 1982) (holding
that son was a resident of the household even though the son only lived with his
parents while on strike)).
16. See id.
17. See id. at 688.
18. See id. The court also reiterated that the court's determination of a
person's residence is a question of fact. See id. at 687 (citing Krause by Krause v.
Mutual Serv. Cas. Co., 399 N.W.2d 597, 601 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) and Auto-
Owners Ins. Co. v. Harris by Harris, 374 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)).
19. See id. at 688.
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rent to live at Neumann's duplex indicating Brenny's intent to live
at the duplex.2° The court also noted that there was evidence of
Brenny's physical presence at the duplex because, at the time of
the dog bite, Brenny spent more of her time at Neumann's duplex
than at any other place.2'
In addition, the court specifically rejected certain other factors
as more indicative of whether a person is a "resident of a
household" rather than a "resident of a residence. 2  The factors
that the court rejected included any consideration of: (1) the
length of stay at the residence, (2) whether the resident's presence
at the residence was continuous and significant, and (3) whether
there was any special relationship between the renting and
subletting resident occupants. 5 The court noted that while these
factors are typically used to determine whether a person is a
"resident of a household," the factors are not helpful to determine
the broader question of whether a person is a "resident of a
residence." 4
B. Statute of Limitations for Uninsured Motorist Claims
The statute of limitations for judicial proceedings in an
uninsured motorist claim begins to run on the day of the accident
25-that gives rise to the claim. When the insured seeks to arbitrate
the claim pursuant to the insurance policy's arbitration clause, the
six-year statute of limitations does not begin to run until there has
26been a demand for arbitration and a refusal to arbitrate.
Recently, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reaffirmed an insured's
right to arbitrate an uninsured-motorist claim without regard to the
six-year statute of limitations that governs the claim's judicial
proceedings. In Hughes v. Lund, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 687-88.
23. See id. Brenny unsuccessfully argued that length-of-stay and continuous-
and-significant-presence were supported in the case law. See id. at 687 (citing
American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thiem, 498 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993) and Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Viktora, 318 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Minn. 1982)).
24. See id.
25. See Weeks v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 580 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Minn.
1998).
26. See Spira v. American Standard Ins. Co., 361 N.W.2d 454, 457 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985).
27. See Hughes v. Lund, 603 N.W.2d 674, 678-79 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
2000] 1335
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held that "if the insured seeks to arbitrate a claim pursuant to an
arbitration clause in the policy, the statute of limitations on
plaintiff's claim does not begin to run until there has been a
demand and a refusal to arbitrate."
28
Patrick Hughes was a passenger in Douglas Rykel's motor
vehicle when the vehicle was rear-ended on January 17, 1992.29
Auto-Owners Insurance Company insured Rykel's vehicle.0
Hughes and several others collectively sued Auto-Owners seeking
uninsured motorist benefits. 1 Hughes served notice of the lawsuit
on Auto-Owners by mail, but Hughes's service-by-mail notice did
not comply with the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 4.05.32 On
August 20, 1998, Auto-Owners moved for summary judgment
arguing that the six-year statute of limitations barred the plaintiffs
claims because the plaintiffs did not commence the suit properl%
and because the plaintiffs did not demand arbitration in writing.
The district court granted Auto-Owner's summary judgment
motion, ruling that the uninsured motorist claim was time-barred
because the statute of limitations began to run on the date of the
accident. The district court also ruled, inter alia, that Hughes's
attempted service by mail was ineffectual.35
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed
in part, ruling that: (1) where the party claiming the right to
arbitrate does not start a lawsuit, the right to demand arbitration is
not defeated by the normal waiver attached to starting a lawsuit,
and (2) unless there is a contractual restriction on when arbitration
must be demanded, the six-year statute of limitations does not
28. Id. at 678.
29. See id. at 675.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 677. MINN. R. CIrv. P. 4.05 (1996) provides that:
In any action service may be made by mailing a copy of the summons and
of the complaint (by first-class mail, postage prepaid) to the person to be
served, together with two copies of a notice and acknowledgement
conforming substantially to Form 22 and a return envelope, postage
prepaid, addressed to the sender. If acknowledgement of service under
this rule is not received by the sender within the time defendant is required by these
rules to serve the answer, service shall be ineffectual
MINN. R. Civ. P. 4.05 (emphasis added).
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begin to run until there has been a demand and refusal to
arbitrate.
3 6
First, the court considered whether the appellants waived their
right to arbitration. 7 The court noted the overwhelming weight of
authority indicating that where a party commences a lawsuit in the
38face of an arbitration clause, that party waives its right to arbitrate.
Next, the court examined Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 4.05
to determine whether Hughes complied with the service-by-mail
requirements. 39 The service by mail was ineffective because Hughes
"did not include an acknowledgement form and [a] self-addressed,
postage-prepaid, return envelope" and because Auto-Owners "did
not acknowledge service under examined Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure 4.05] . As a result, the court concluded that the
district court action was a nullity, and that "by not commencing a
lawsuit, [Hughes] did not waive [his] right to arbitration.,
41
The court also considered whether the cause of action was
time-barred by the six-year statute of limitations governing
uninsured motorist claims.42 The court noted that the six-year
statute of limitations that begins to accrue from the date of the
accident is confined to judicial proceedings.40 The six-year statute
of limitations that applies to arbitration proceedings does not
begin to accrue until there has been a demand for arbitration and
a refusal to arbitrate.44
Because Hughes's service of process was ineffective and the
district court action was a nullity, the appeals court held, as a
matter of law, that Hughes never started the lawsuit.45 As a result,
"by not commencing the lawsuit [Hughes] did not waive [his] right
36. See id. at 678-79.
37. See id. at 676.
38. See id. The court cited several cases including Preferred Fin. Corp. v.
Quality Homes, Inc., 439 N.W.2d 741, 743 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
actions inconsistent with the right to arbitrate indicate a waiver of that right) and
NCR Credit Corp. v. Park Rapids Leasing Assocs., 349 N.W.2d 867, 868 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1984) (holding that "[t] he conduct of a party in starting a lawsuit in the face
of an arbitration clause is a waiver of the right to arbitrate").




43. See id. at 678 (citing Spira v. American Standard Ins. Co., 361 N.W.2d 454,
457 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (citing Har-Mar, Inc. v. Thorsen & Thorshov, Inc, 218
N.W.2d 751, 755-56 (1974), review denied, (Minn. 1998).
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to arbitration. ' 46 Thus, the court concluded that Hughes's right to
arbitrate the uninsured motorist claim was not time-barred,
because Hughes did not waive his right to arbitrate and a demand
and refusal to arbitrate had not yet been made.47
C. Primary Versus Excess Coverage in Uninsured Motorist Claims
Minnesota courts have recently resolved several issues related
to uninsured motorist coverage. For example, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals has declined to extend coverage to a minor child
seeking uninsured motorist benefits gursuant to a non-custodial
parent's automobile insurance policy. Conversely, in a separate
case, the appeals court determined that a passenger injured in an
automobile accident who is not insured under the driver's policy
may recover uninsured motorist benefits to the extent that the
injured passenger's coverage exceeds the driver's underinsured
49
coverage.
In Jirik v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co., the Minnesota Court of
Appeals considered whether a minor could recover uninsured
motorist benefits from a non-custodial father in addition to the
uninsured motorist benefits the minor child received under her
custodial mother's automobile insurance policy." The court
applied Minnesota Statutes section 65B.49 subdivision 3a(5) (1998)
to determine whether the minor child was eligible to receive
uninsured-motorist benefits in excess of the benefits she was
entitled to under her mother's automobile policy.
5
In firik, Teresa Jirik was driving her car when it collided with
an unoccupied truck owned by Switzer's Nursery and Landscaping,
Inc. 3 Joseph Bierman was the last person to operate the truck
before the collision.54 The collision severely injured Danielle Jirik,
TeresaJirik's 13-year-old daughter.55
46. Id. at 677.
47. See id. at 678-79.
48. SeeJirik v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 595 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999).
49. See Schons v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 604 N.W.2d 125,128 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2000).
50. 595 N.W.2d 219 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
51. See id. at 222.
52. See id. at 222-23.
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To settle Danielle Jirik's injury claim, Teresa Jirik's insurance
carrier paid $750,000 of its liability limit and $500,000 in uninsured
motorist benefits.56 In addition, Switzer and Bierman's insurers
paid their liability limits. Danielle also claimed that she was
entitled to her father's uninsured motorist benefit coverage of
58$100,000, but her father's insurer, Auto-Owners, denied coverage.
Danielle Jirik sued Auto-Owners, and the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Auto-Owners, holding that "Danielle
cannot collect [uninsured motorist] benefits from her father's
policy because she was insured under her mother's [uninsured
motorist] policy."59
To determine whether the district court applied the law
correctly, the appeals court first looked at the language of
Minnesota Statutes section 65B.49 subdivision 3a(5) (1998). 6° This
subdivision states, "if the injured person is occupying a motor
vehicle of which the injured person is not an insured, the injured
person may be entitled to excess insurance protection afforded by a
policy in which the injured party is otherwise insured." 61 This
subdivision distinguishes primary from excess coverage and allows
coverage through another policy only where the injured person is
not covered under the primary uninsured motorist policy on the
vehicle involved in the collision.62 The court concluded that since
Danielle Jirik was covered under her mother's policy, she was only
entitled to coverage pursuant to her mother's insurance policy.
The court thereby concluded that Danielle Jirik was not legally
entitled to an additional $100,000 benefit pursuant to her father's
policy.
64
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion
in a related issue in Schons v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.
65
In Schons, the court considered whether a passenger who was not




60. See id. at 221.
61. MINN. STAT. § 65B.49, subd. 3a(5) (1998).
62. Seefifik, 595 N.W.2d at 222.
63. See id. The court noted that although Danielle Jirik was not a named
insured on her mother's policy, no one disputed that she was covered under her
mother's policy. See id. Her mother's policy extended coverage to any minor in
the custody of the named insured. See id.
64. See id.
65. 604 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
2000] 1339
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insured under the driver's policy could recover underinsured
motorist benefits.6 In Schons, Tamara Schons was a passenger in a
Geo Metro driven by Rachel Vogl that collided head-on with a FordS67
pick-up truck driven by Donna Bjorklund. Both Vogl's and
Bjorklund's automobile insurance included liability limits of
$50,000 and uninsured motorist benefits of $50,000. 68 Schons
claimed $400,000 in damages. 69
Schons collected $50,000 from Vogl's liability coverage and
$50,000 from Vogl's uninsured motorist benefit coverage (claiming
that Bjorklund was underinsured). 70 In addition, Schons collected
$48,000 from Bjorklund's liability coverage." Schons then sued
State Farm seeking $50,000 from her own State Farm policy,
72claiming that Vogl was underinsured.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of State
Farm ruling that, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 65B.49
subd. 3a(5), Schons was legally entitled to additional benefits
under her own policy only if her uninsured motorist coverage
exceeded the benefits received from Vogl's uninsured motorist
policy. 73 The appeals court affirmed the district court's decision
noting that Schons could only recover uninsured motorist benefits
under her own policy to the extent that her coverage exceeded
Vogl's coverage. The court held that "Schons could not receive
more than $50,000 in total [uninsured motorist ("UIM")] benefits
because her own UIM coverage did not 'exceed' the coverage
provided by Vogl's policy. " 75
D. A Motorist's Intentional Act Does Not Give Rise to Third-Party Benefits
On April 20, 1999, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
considered, as a matter of first impression, whether an insured
motorist's intentional act could result in tort liability to a third
76party. In Nygaard v. State Farm Insurance Co., the Minnesota Court
66. See id. at 127.







74. See id. at 128.
75. Id. at 127.
76. See Nygaard v. State Farm Ins. Co., 591 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Minn. Ct. App.
1340 [Vol. 26:4
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of Appeals held that third-party-liability coverage does not arise
from an insured motorist's intentional act.77  To reach this
conclusion the court determined that for the purposes of third-
party-liability coverage, the term "accident," as used in an insurance
policy, is viewed from the perspective of the insured motorist and
that a motorist's intentional act is not an "accident.,
78
In Nygaard, Eileen Nygaard served as the personal
representative of her daughter's estate. 79  Nygaard's daughter,
Donna Link, committed suicide on February 27, 1995, by driving
her automobile into an eighteen-wheel tractor-trailer. 80 The force
of the collision pushed the tractor-trailer into the ditch.8 ' After the
collision, the tractor-trailer's driver, Lonnie Odegard, required
surgery to repair his shoulder, which was damaged in the
82 83collision. Odegard also lost time at work." Subsequently,
Odegard received approximately $28,000 in worker's compensation
benefits.8 4
Odegard's worker's compensation insurer first sued the
decedent's insurer, State Farm Insurance Company (State Farm),
to recover the amount of worker's compensation benefits paid to
85Odegard. The decedent's mother, acting as personal
representative, joined the suit to compel State Farm to provide
86insurance coverage to Odegard. On a motion for summary
judgment, State Farm argued that the accident provision in the
decedent's policy precluded coverage because the suicide was an
intentional act. The district court granted State Farm's motion
1999).
77. See id. at 742.
78. See id. at 741.
79. See id. at 740.
80. See id. at 739. It was apparent that Ms. Link intended to commit suicide
that afternoon, because she left behind suicide notes addressed to her parents and
to her best friend. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 73940.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 740.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id. The liability section of Ms. Link's insurance policy provided that
"[State Farm] will: 1. pay damages which an insured becomes legally liable to pay
because of: (a) bodily injury to others, and (b) damage to or destruction of
property including loss of its use, caused by accident resulting from the ownership,
maintenance or use of your car,..." Id.
2000] 1341
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for summary judgment, and Eileen Nygaard appealed.""
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the district court
and held that "[t] he decedent's intentional act of suicide [did] not
constitute an 'accident' for purposes of third-party liability
insurance coverage."8 9  The court's holding in Nygaard resulted
from a two-step analysis. 90  First, the court considered whose
perspective should be considered to define the term "accident."'
Second, the court considered whether the collision was covered
under the decedent's insurance policy.9'
To determine whose perspective should be considered to
define the term "accident," the court first looked at the definition
of the term "accident."93  The court noted that the Minnesota
Supreme Court has defined an "accident" as "simply a happening
that is unexpected and unintended."94 The court concluded that
while Odegard's injuries may have been unexpected, the appeals
court must also consider the Minnesota Supreme Court's holding
in cases like Lobeck v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. and
McIntosh v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.
95
In Lobeck, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered certain
policy exclusions and distinguished between first-party benefits
(benefits that arise from no-fault coverage) and third-party benefits
(benefits that arise from uninsured-motorist coverage) in light of
96the Minnesota No-Fault Act. The Minnesota Supreme Court held
that while the No-Fault Act requires first-party benefits, exclusions
to third-party coverage are valid. 97  Similarly in McIntosh, the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that the availability of first-party,
no-fault benefits is determined from the victim's perspective, and
the availability of third-party, uninsured-motorist benefits is
88. See id.
89. Id. at 742.
90. See id. at 740-41.
91. Seeid. at 741.
92. See id. at 741-42.
93. See id. at 741. The court noted that the decedent's policy was
unambiguous and that the policy covered accidents. See id.
94. Id. (citing McIntosh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 488 N.W.2d 476,
478 (Minn. 1992) (citing Weis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 242 Minn. 141,
144, 64 N.W.2d 366, 368 (Minn. 1954) (defining an accident as "an unexpected
happening without intention or design")).
95. See id. (citing Lobeck v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 582 N.W.2d 246,
250 (Minn. 1998) and McIntosh, 488 N.W.2d at 476).
96. See Lobeck, 582 N.W.2d at 250.
97. See id. at 250.
1342 [Vol. 26:4
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determined from the perspective of the tort-feasor. 98
The Minnesota Court of Appeals determined that the analysis
in Lobeck and McIntosh was persuasive because the third-party
liability benefits claimed by Nygaard were similar to uninsured-
motorist benefits in that both types of claims must be proven under
tort law. 99 As a result, liability to a third party for the first-party's act
focuses on the tort-feasor-the first party. Thus, to determine if
the collision was an accident for the purposes of third-party
coverage, the collision is viewed from the perspective of the tort-
feasor, and in Nygaard the tort-feasor was the decedent who
committed suicide.10 Since the suicide was intentional, and since
the decedent's insurance coverage was limited to injuries resulting
from accidents, the appeals court affirmed the district court and
denied coverage.102
David March
98. See McIntosh, 488 N.W.2d at 479-80.
99. See Nygaard, 591 N.W.2d at 741.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id. The dissent argued that the focus should be on whether the
decedent intended to injure Odegard. See id. at 743 (Amundson, J., dissenting).
The dissent further argued that since intent could not be determined, Odegard
should be allowed to recover under the decedent's policy. See id.
20001 1343
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